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Abstract We assess the sustainability of public finances in the EU-15 over the
period 1970–2006 using stationarity and cointegration analysis. Specifically, we use
panel unit root tests of the first and second generation allowing in some cases for
structural breaks. We also apply modern panel cointegration techniques developed
by Pedroni (Oxf Bull Econ Stat 61(1):653–670, 1999; Econom Theory 20(3):597–
625, 2004), generalized by Banerjee and Carrion-i-Silvestre (Cointegration in panel
data with breaks and cross-section dependence, European Central Bank, Working
Paper 591, 2006) and Westerlund and Edgerton (Econ Lett 97(3):185–190, 2007), to
a structural long-run equation between general government expenditures and rev-
enues. While estimations point to fiscal sustainability being an issue in some
countries, fiscal policy was sustainable both for the EU-15 panel set, and within sub-
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1 Introduction
The sustainability of public finances is a key policy issue for the European Union
(EU). Within the EU fiscal framework, fiscal discipline is an important support for
the implementation of monetary policy, particularly in the case of the EMU member
countries. In EMU, the existence of sound fiscal policies is seen as a necessary
objective for individual countries to pursue. It is not possible to exclude adverse
responses from the financial markets when fiscal behaviour is deemed to be
unsustainable. Indeed, the accumulation of government debt, following continued
budgetary imbalances, may in the end trigger the need for higher long-term interest
rates in order to place additional sovereign debt in the markets. Moreover, the
Treaties governing the EU also require sustainable public finances. Countries are
urged to comply with the budgetary requirements of EMU, by avoiding excessive
deficits, keeping debt levels below the 60% of GDP reference value, and respecting
the requirements of the stability and growth pact (SGP).
The aim of this paper is to examine the sustainability of public finances for the
EU-15 countries (covering the EU Member States before the 1 May 2004
enlargement) by applying recent advances in the econometrics of non-stationary
panel data methods.1 The econometric literature on unit roots and cointegration
testing has been expanding rapidly, and now distinguishes between the first
generation tests developed on the assumption of cross-section independence (except
for common time effects), and the second generation tests that allow, in a variety of
forms and degrees, the dependence that might prevail across the different units in
the panel. This question is crucial and responds to the complex nature of the
interactions and dependencies that generally exist over time and across the
individual units in the panel. For instance, observations on firms, industries, regions
and countries tend to be cross-correlated as well as serially dependent. As pointed
out by Breitung and Pesaran (2005), the problem of cross-section dependence is
particularly difficult to deal with since it could arise for a variety of reasons,
including spatial spillover effects, common unobserved shocks, social interactions,
or a combination of these factors. In the context of our paper, cross-dependence can
mirror possible changes in the behaviour of fiscal authorities related to the signing
of the EU Treaty in Maastricht on 7 February 1992, with the setting up of the
convergence criteria that urged the EU countries to consolidate public finances in
the run-up to the EMU on 1 January 1999, when most EU legacy currencies were
replaced by the euro, and in the context of the SGP since then.
Generally, fiscal sustainability is considered on a country basis and can usually
only be restored by changing national fiscal policies. From a monetary policy point
of view, fiscal policy in the current institutional setting of EMU must be considered
a largely national competence and responsibility. Although, even if there is no
1 The countries are: Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Greece, Spain, France, Italy, Luxembourg,
the Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, Finland, Sweden and the UK.
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single fiscal policy in the EU, a panel sustainability analysis of public finances has
to be seen as relevant in a context of EU countries seeking to pursue common and
sound fiscal policy behaviour within the SGP framework. Possible cross-country
dependence can be envisaged either in the run-up to EMU or, for example, via
integrated financial markets. Indeed, with cross-country spillovers in government
bond markets especially after the completion of the single EU-15 capital market
from 1994 were to be expected, interest rates comovements inside the EU became
also more noticeable.
To the best of our knowledge, few comparable studies have taken into account
the possible cross-sectional dependence among countries when investigating the
sustainability of public finances for the EU-15 countries. A few studies provide
panel unit root and panel cointegration analysis in this context, notably Prohl and
Schneider (2006), for eight OECD countries and Claeys (2007) for the EU (not
allowing for cross-section dependence). Indeed, although the main analytical
techniques used to analyse the sustainability of public finances have been
stationarity tests for the stock of public debt and cointegration tests between
government expenditures and government revenues, this has been mostly performed
for individual countries, which sometimes poses the problem of relatively short time
series.2 This paper takes these results in the literature regarding the sustainability of
public finances, and assesses them to see whether they still hold when more
powerful cointegration techniques are employed in a panel framework.
Our econometric methodology uses two approaches for unit root testing: panel
data integration tests of ‘‘first generation’’ (Im et al. 2003; Levin et al. 2002), which
assume cross-sectional independence among panel units (except for common time
effects); and panel data unit root tests of the ‘‘second generation’’ (Choi 2006; Moon
and Perron 2004), which allow for more general forms of cross sectional
dependency (not only limited to common time effects). We also implement panel
cointegration techniques developed by Pedroni (1999, 2004), and generalised by
Banerjee and Carrion-i-Silvestre (2006) and Westerlund and Edgerton (2007), to a
structural long-run equation between general government expenditures and
revenues. The advantages of panel data methods within the macro-panel setting
include the use of data for which the spans of individual time series data are
insufficient for the study of many hypotheses of interest. Other benefits include
better properties of the testing procedures when compared to more standard time
series methods, and the fact that many of the issues studied, such as convergence,
purchasing power parity or the sustainability of public finances, naturally lend
themselves to being studied in a panel context.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In Sect. 2 we briefly review
the analytical framework of public finance sustainability. In Sect. 3 we present a
brief overview of our fiscal data. In Sect. 4 we perform the stationarity analysis of
the fiscal series. In Sect. 5 we report the cointegration results for the general
government expenditure and revenue series. Finally, Sect. 6 concludes the paper.
2 Examples of empirical tests of fiscal sustainability on an individual country basis are provided, for
instance, by Hamilton and Flavin (1986), Trehan and Walsh (1991), Wilcox (1989), Hakkio and Rush
(1991), Tanner and Liu (1994), Quintos (1995), Haug (1991), Ahmed and Rogers (1995), Payne (1997),
Bohn (1998), Fe`ve and He´nin (2000), Uctum and Wickens (2000), Bergman (2001) and Afonso (2005).
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2 The analytical framework of public finance sustainability
In the beginning of the 1920s, when writing about the public debt problem faced by
France, Keynes (1923) highlighted the need for the French government to conduct a
sustainable fiscal policy in order to satisfy its budget constraint. Keynes stated that
the absence of sustainability would be evident when ‘‘the State’s contractual
liabilities (…) have reached an excessive proportion of the national income’’ (p. 54).
In modern terms, the sustainability of public finances is challenged when the
government debt-to-GDP ratio reaches an excessive value. There is a problem of
sustainability when the government revenues are not enough to keep on financing
the costs associated with the new issuance of public debt or, again in Keynes words,
when ‘‘it has become clear that the claims of the bond-holders are more than the tax
payers can support’’ (p. 55). At that point the government will have to take measures
that restore the sustainability of fiscal policy, meaning that the State ‘‘must come in
due course to some compromise between increasing taxation, and diminishing
expenditure, and reducing what (…) [it] owe[s]’’ (p. 59).
From an analytical perspective, the issue of fiscal policy sustainability can be
presented in a straightforward way with the so-called present value borrowing
constraint (PVBC). In order to derive the PVBC of a single country, the flow
government budget constraint for a given period t can be written as
Gt þ ð1 þ rtÞBt1 ¼ Rt þ Bt; ð1Þ
where G is the primary government expenditure, R is the government revenue, B is
the government debt, and r is the real interest rate.3 Rewriting (1) for the subsequent
periods, and recursively solving that equation leads to the following intertemporal
budget constraint:
Bt ¼
X1
s¼1
Rtþs  Gtþs
Qs
j¼1
ð1 þ rtþjÞ
þlims!1
Ys
j¼1
Btþs
ð1 þ rtþjÞ: ð2Þ
When the second term from the right-hand side of Eq. (2) is zero, the present
value of the existing stock of public debt will be identical to the present value of
future primary surpluses. For empirical purposes it is useful to make several
algebraic modifications to Eq. (1). Assuming that the real interest rate is stationary,
with mean r, and defining
Et ¼ Gt þ ðrt  rÞBt1; ð3Þ
it is possible to obtain the following PVBC:
Bt1 ¼
X1
s¼1
1
ð1 þ rÞsþ1ðRtþl  EtþsÞ þ lims!1
Btþs
ð1 þ rÞsþ1: ð4Þ
A sustainable fiscal policy needs to ensure that the present value of the stock of
public debt, the second term of the right-hand side of (4), goes to zero in infinity,
3 For the validation of theoretical results, the real interest rate is sometimes assumed in the literature to be
stationary, but this is a much more difficult assumption for the nominal interest rate.
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constraining the debt to grow no faster than the real interest rate. In other words, it
implies imposing the absence of Ponzi games and the fulfilment of the intertemporal
budget constraint. Faced with this transversality condition, the government will
have to achieve future primary surpluses whose present value adds up to the current
value of the stock of public debt.4
It is also worth noting that the hypothesis of fiscal policy sustainability is related to
the condition that the trajectory of the main macroeconomic variables is not affected
by the choice between the issuance of public debt and the increase in taxation. Under
such conditions, it would therefore be irrelevant how the deficits are financed, which
also implies the assumption of the Ricardian Equivalence hypothesis.5
In addition, one can also derive the solvency condition, with all the variables
defined as a percentage of GDP.6 The PVBC, with the variables expressed as ratios
of GDP, with y being the real GDP growth rate, and neglecting for presentation
purposes seigniorage revenues, is then written as
Bt
Yt
¼ ð1 þ rtÞð1 þ ytÞ
Bt1
Yt1
þ G1
Y1
 R1
Y1
: ð5Þ
Assuming the real interest rate to be stationary, with mean r, and considering also
constant real GDP growth, the budget constraint is then given by
bt1 ¼
X1
s¼0
1 þ y
1 þ r
 ðsþ1Þ
½qtþs  etþs þ lim
s!1 btþs
1 þ y
1 þ r
 ðsþ1Þ
ð6Þ
with bt = Bt /Yt, et = Et /Yt and qt = Rt /Yt. When r [ y, it is necessary to introduce
a solvency condition, given by lims!1 btþs 1þy1þr
 ðsþ1Þ
¼ 0, in order to bound public
debt growth.7 This yields the familiar result that fiscal policy will be sustainable if
the present value of the future stream of primary surpluses, as a percentage of GDP,
matches the ‘‘inherited’’ stock of government debt. In a similar fashion, looking at
the US after the end of the Second World War, Domar (1944) pointed out that it
would be possible to sustain successive primary budget deficits as long as the real
growth rate surpasses the real interest rate (y [ r).
A common practice in the literature is to investigate past fiscal data to see if
government debt follows a stationary process or to establish if there is cointegration
between government revenues and government expenditures.8 Recalling the PVBC
in Eq. (4), it is possible to ascertain empirically the absence of Ponzi games by
testing the stationarity of the first difference of the stock of public debt, using unit
4 McCallum (1984) discusses whether this is a necessary condition to obtain an optimal growth trajectory
for the stock of public debt.
5 Afonso (2008) provides evidence of overall Ricardian behaviour on the part of EU-15 governments.
6 For instance, Hakkio and Rush (1991) suggest that an analysis based on ratios (to GDP) is more
appropriate for growing economies.
7 This implies that the growth rate of the debt-to-GDP ratio should be less than the factor ((1 ? y)/
(1 ? r))(s?1).
8 Hamilton and Flavin (1986) first used these procedures. See also Trehan and Walsh (1991) and Hakkio
and Rush (1991).
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root tests both at the country level and for a European panel. It is also possible to
assess fiscal policy sustainability through cointegration tests. The implicit hypoth-
esis concerning the real interest rate, with mean r, is also stationarity. Using again
the auxiliary variable Et = Gt ? (rt - r)Bt-1, and the additional definition
GGt = Gt ? rtBt-1, the intertemporal budget constraint may also be written as
GGt  Rt ¼
X1
s¼0
1
ð1 þ rÞs1ðDRtþs  DEtþsÞ þ
lim
s !1
Btþs
ð1 þ rÞsþ1 ð7Þ
and with the no-Ponzi game condition, GGt and Rt must be cointegrated variables of
order one for their first differences to be stationary.
Assuming that R and E are non-stationary variables, and that the first differences are
stationary variables, this implies that the series R and E in levels are I(1). Then, for Eq.
(7) to hold, its left-hand side will also have to be stationary. If it is possible to conclude
that GG and R are integrated of order 1, these two variables should be cointegrated
with cointegration vector (1, -1) for the left-hand side of Eq. (7) to be stationary.
The procedure to assess the sustainability of the intertemporal government budget
constraint therefore involves testing the following cointegration regression:
Rt = a ? bGGt ? ut. If the null of no cointegration, i.e. the hypothesis that the two
I(1) variables are not cointegrated, is rejected (with a high-test statistic), this implies that
one should accept the alternative hypothesis of cointegration. For that result to hold true,
the series of the residual ut must be stationary, and should not display a unit root.
Hakkio and Rush (1991) also demonstrate that if GG and R are non-stationary
variables in levels, the condition 0 \ b \ 1 is a sufficient condition for the budget
constraint to be obeyed. However, when government revenues and expenditures are
expressed as a percentage of GDP (or in per capita terms), it is necessary to have
b = 1 in order for the trajectory of the government debt to GDP ratio not to diverge
in an infinite horizon.9 In terms of our subsequent empirical analysis, we will assess
the stationarity of government debt, a sufficient but not necessary condition for
fiscal sustainability, and the existence of cointegration between government
revenues and expenditures, a necessary condition for fiscal sustainability.
3 Fiscal data overview
All data are taken from the European Commission AMECO (Annual Macro-
Economic Data) database, covering the period 1970–2006 for the EU-15
countries.10 Table 1 reports summary statistics for our main fiscal variables.
9 Quintos (1995), Ahmed and Rogers (1995) and Bergman (2001) discuss the necessary conditions for
sustainability in terms of the order of integration of public debt.
10 AMECO codes: GDP at current market prices, .1.0.0.0.UVGD; gross domestic product, at 2000 market
prices, .1.1.0.0.OVGD; general government consolidated gross debt, excessive deficit procedure (based
on ESA 1995) and former definition (linked series) (% of GDP); .1.0.319.0.UDGGL, .1.0.319.0.UDGGF;
general government debt (level), .1.0.0.0.UDGGL, .1.0.0.0.UDGGF; general government total expen-
diture (% of GDP), .1.0.319.0.UUTGE, .1.0.319.0.UUTGF; general government total revenue (% of
GDP), .1.0.319.0.URTG, .1.0.319.0.URTGF; general government interest payments (% of GDP),
.1.0.319.0.UYIG, .1.0.319.0.UYIGF (database updated on 04/05/2007).
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In the period 1970–2006 the highest government debt-to-GDP ratios were
recorded in Belgium, Italy, Greece and Ireland, related to high budget deficits
incurred by those countries, and resulted notably in the pushing up of interest
payments. The government expenditure-to-GDP ratios ranged overall between some
20 and 70%, with the lower values being recorded in the beginning of the period,
Table 1 Statistical summary for fiscal variables (% of GDP, 1970–2006)
Country Government debt Primary balance
Mean Max. Min. n Mean Max. Min. n
Austria 48.0 67.9 16.7 37 0.9 3.5 -2.0 37
Belgium 97.9 133.4 54.3 37 2.0 6.8 -4.8 37
Denmark 48.3 80.1 6.2 36 4.5 11.6 -3.0 37
Finland 26.6 57.8 6.1 36 4.0 9.7 -3.3 37
France 42.3 66.6 19.8 30 0.2 1.9 -2.3 37
Germany 42.5 67.9 18.0 37 0.2 2.8 -4.1 37
Greece 67.2 114.0 17.5 30 -0.7 5.0 -6.7 37
Ireland 67.5 112.9 25.8 37 0.8 6.6 -7.3 37
Italy 84.9 121.5 37.4 37 -0.7 6.6 -6.7 37
Luxembourg 9.3 20.3 4.1 37 2.6 6.4 -1.6 37
Netherlands 60.6 78.5 39.6 32 1.7 5.0 -1.3 37
Portugal 47.7 67.4 14.2 34 -0.4 3.9 -7.4 37
Spain 37.3 66.8 11.8 32 0.0 3.1 -4.4 37
Sweden 49.2 73.2 24.6 34 4.0 10.3 -5.6 37
United Kingdom 49.9 77.4 33.4 37 1.1 6.8 -4.8 37
Country Government revenue Government expenditure
Mean Max. Min. n Mean Max. Min. n
Austria 48.0 52.5 38.3 37 50.1 56.7 37.1 37
Belgium 46.3 51.1 38.1 37 51.6 62.1 40.2 37
Denmark 52.9 58.1 44.0 37 52.6 60.6 39.5 37
Finland 48.9 57.1 33.6 37 46.5 64.7 29.5 37
France 46.2 50.9 37.1 37 48.4 54.5 36.5 37
Germany 44.3 46.6 39.6 37 46.6 49.9 39.1 37
Greece 34.0 47.0 22.5 37 40.3 52.0 22.6 37
Ireland 36.5 43.6 29.2 37 40.9 53.2 31.6 37
Italy 38.7 47.6 27.9 37 46.2 56.3 32.1 37
Luxembourg 40.4 44.4 27.8 35 38.5 45.2 25.3 35
Netherlands 48.5 53.8 41.2 37 51.0 59.2 42.7 37
Portugal 32.6 43.5 20.6 37 36.9 47.8 18.6 37
Spain 32.8 40.1 20.9 37 35.2 46.6 20.3 37
Sweden 57.4 62.3 46.0 37 57.6 72.4 41.8 37
United Kingdom 39.8 44.1 34.9 37 42.3 45.4 36.9 37
Source European Commission AMECO database
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while the government revenue-to-GDP ratios were in the interval between 20 and
60%. Additionally, visual inspection of the revenue and expenditure time series as a
ratio of GDP, as exemplified in Fig. 1 for selected countries, and in advance of the
subsequent econometric analysis, may help to assess sustainability issues in
individual cases.
4 Stationarity analysis of fiscal series
In this section we study the stationarity of the fiscal series in our country panel,
specifically the stock of government debt in real terms and the ratios to GDP of
government revenue and government expenditure, using several panel unit root
tests, which allow notably for cross-country independence and dependence.11
4.1 First generation panel unit root tests (cross-country independence)
In this sub-section, we implement the following ‘‘first generation’’ panel data unit
root tests (Im et al. 2003; Levin et al. 2002). First, we used the test proposed by Im
11 Note that to make the analysis robust, we also compared the results of panel data unit root tests with
those obtained with individual unit root tests (see Sect. 7 for a summary of the results). For complete
details on this comparison see the working paper version in Afonso and Rault (2007).
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Fig. 1 Fiscal variables for selected countries. Source European Commission AMECO database
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et al. (2003, hereafter IPS), which has been widely implemented in empirical
research due to its rather simple methodology and alternative hypothesis of
heterogeneity. This test assumes cross-sectional independence among panel units
(except for common time effects), but allows for heterogeneity in the form of
individual deterministic effects (constant and/or linear time trend), and heteroge-
neous serial correlation structure of the error terms. Tables 2, 3 and 4 report the
results of the IPS test for the government debt, and for the revenue and expenditure
ratio series. In order to facilitate comparisons, we also provide the results of the
panel unit root tests of Levin et al. (2002).
Concerning the first difference of the stock of government debt, the results given
by the panel data unit root tests are more concomitant than those provided by the
standard (individual) unit root ones. Indeed, at the 5% level of significance, the two
panel data tests reveal that the null unit root hypothesis can be rejected at the 5%
level for EU-15 countries (see Table 2), thus supporting the stationarity of the
change in the stock of government debt and hence the non-rejection of the solvency
condition for the overall country sample.12
As far as the general government revue-to-GDP ratio is concerned, the two panel
data tests produce significant evidence in favour of their integration of order one for
all EU-15 countries at the 5% level of significance (see Table 3). In other words, the
non-stationarity of the revenue-to-GDP ratio cannot be rejected. Finally, and
according to Table 4, the general government expenditure-to-GDP ratio also
appears to have a unit root for all countries at the 5% level of significance if one
refers to the results of the two panel data unit root tests.
However, as shown by several authors (notably O’Connell 1998; and Banerjee
et al. 2004, 2005), the assumption of cross-sectional dependence limited to the case
of common time effects on which the asymptotic results of the IPS’s procedure
relies (like most panel data unit root tests of ‘‘the first generation’’, including Levin
et al. 2002) is often unrealistic and can be at odds with economic theory and
Table 2 Summary of panel data unit root tests for the first difference of the stock of government debt,
constant prices (1970–2006)
Method Statistic P-valuea Cross-sections Obs.
Null: unit root (assumes common unit root process)
Levin, Lin and Chu t-stat. -1.92991 0.0268 15 494
Null: unit root (assumes individual unit root process)
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat. -3.18952 0.0007 15 494
Automatic selection of lags based on SIC. Newey–West bandwidth selection using a Bartlett kernel
a The tests assume asymptotic normality
12 A common feature of the panel tests mentioned above is that they maintained the null hypothesis of a
unit root in all panel members. Therefore, their rejection decision actually indicates that at least one panel
member is stationary, with no information about how many series or which ones are stationary. This
possibility for a mixed panel implies that some of the members may be stationary while others may be
non-stationary (see Taylor and Sarno 1998 and Taylor and Taylor 2004 for further details).
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empirical results. Besides, as shown in two simulation studies by Banerjee et al.
(2004, 2005), if panel members are cross-correlated or even cross-sectionally
cointegrated, all these tests experience strong size distortions and limited power.
This point is analytically confirmed by Lyhagen (2000) and Pedroni and Urbain
(2001).
4.2 Second generation panel unit root tests (cross-country dependence)
As Breitung and Pesaran (2005) note, time series are contemporaneously correlated
in many macroeconomic applications using country or regional data. Prominent
examples of this are the analysis of purchasing power parity and output convergence
(see for instance Pesaran 2004). However, the literature on how to model cross-
sectional dependence in large panels is still developing. Cross-sectional dependence
can arise due to a variety of factors, such as omitted observed common factors,
spatial spillover effects, for example via integrated financial markets, unobserved
common factors, or general residual interdependence, all of which could remain
even when all observed and unobserved common effects have been taken into
account. In the EU context, some possible cross-country dependence can be
envisaged in the presence of a similar policy measures (i.e. in the run-up to EMU),
coupled with similar fiscal behaviour (e.g. pursuing fiscal consolidation in the
run-up to EMU and within the SGP framework), and cross-country spillovers in
Table 3 Summary of panel data unit root tests for general government revenue-to-GDP ratios (1970–
2006)
Method Statistic P-valuea Cross-sections Obs.
Null: unit root (assumes common unit root process)
Levin, Lin and Chu t-stat. -0.77258 0.2199 15 534
Null: unit root (assumes individual unit root process)
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat. 2.09943 0.9821 15 534
Automatic selection of lags based on SIC. Newey–West bandwidth selection using a Bartlett kernel
a The tests assume asymptotic normality
Table 4 Summary of panel data unit root tests for general government expenditure-to-GDP ratios
(1970–2006)
Method Statistic P-valuea Cross-sections Obs.
Null: unit root (assumes common unit root process)
Levin, Lin and Chu t-stat. -0.88260 0.1887 15 450
Null: unit root (assumes individual unit root process)
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat. 2.61169 0.9955 15 450
Automatic selection of lags based on SIC. Newey–West bandwidth selection using a Bartlett kernel
a The tests assume asymptotic normality
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government bond markets especially after the completion of the single EU-15
capital market from 1994 (stage 2 of EMU).13
For this reason, various recent studies have proposed panel unit root tests
allowing for more general forms of cross-sectional dependency, e.g. Choi (2006),
Moon and Perron (2004), and Phillips and Sul (2003). We have decided to
investigate the presence of a unit root using two-second generation tests, namely
Choi (2006) and Moon and Perron (2004), to whom we refer the reader for further
details.14 This last test in particular seems to show good size and power for different
values of T and N and model specifications, according to the Monte Carlo
experiments conducted by Gutierrez (2006).15
The results reported in Tables 5 and 6 indicate that the null unit root hypothesis
cannot be rejected by the two tests at the 5% level for the government expenditure
and revenue ratios, but can be rejected for the government debt for all EU-15
countries, which supports the initial results produced by the first generation panel
data unit root tests. Furthermore, tests on the series in first differences confirm the
hypothesis of stationarity for government expenditure and revenue ratios. Therefore,
we may conclude that the general government revenue and expenditure-to-GDP
ratios expressed in level are integrated of order 1 for all EU-15 countries,
independently of the panel unit root tests considered, thereby demonstrating that the
non-stationarity property of our revenue and expenditure series is a robust result.
Table 5 Results of Choi (2006) test (1970–2006)
Pm-statistic Z-statistic L*-statistic
First difference of the stock of public debt 0.000 0.000 0.000
General government revenue-to-GDP ratios 0.463 0.354 0.354
General government expenditure-to-GDP ratios 0.364 0.382 0.373
Note that the Pm-test is a modification of Fisher’s (1932) inverse Chi-square tests, and rejects the null unit
root hypothesis for positive large value of the statistics, and that the L* is a logit test. The tests (Z and L*)
reject the null for large negative values of the statistics. The P-, Z- and L*-tests converge under the null to
a standard normal distribution as (N, T ? ?) (see Choi 2006 for further details)
Note All figures reported in the table are p-values
13 It should be noted that before carrying out the second generation panel unit-root tests that account for
cross-section dependence, we have first implemented the simple test of Pesaran (2004) and have
computed the CD statistic to test for the presence of such cross-section dependence in the data. This test is
based on the average of pair-wise correlation coefficients of the OLS residuals obtained from standard
augmented Dickey–Fuller regressions for each individual. Its null hypothesis is cross-sectional
independence and is asymptotically distributed as a two-tailed standard normal distribution. The null
hypothesis is always rejected regardless of the number of lags included in the augmented DF auxiliary
regression (up to five lags) at the 5% level of significance. This confirms that the members of our panel
are cross-sectionally correlated.
14 Note that another possibility would be to use a procedure as the one advocated by Breuer et al. (2002)
whereby unit root testing is conducted within a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) framework. An
advantage of this procedure is that the SUR framework is another useful way of addressing cross-
sectional dependency.
15 We are grateful to C. Hurlin for making available his Matlab codes to us.
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4.3 Panel unit root tests allowing for structural breaks
The presence of structural breaks in panel series data can induce behaviour similar
to that of an integrated process, making it difficult to differentiate between a unit
root and a stationary process with a regime shift. For this reason, the panel unit root
tests in the previous section, such as the IPS test, may potentially suffer from a
significant loss of power if structural breaks are present in the data.
In this section, we employ the panel data unit root test based on the Lagrangian
multiplier (LM) principle developed by Im and Lee (2001), which is very flexible
since it can be applied not only when a structural break occurs at a different time
period in each time series, but also when the structural break occurs in only some of
the time series. The proposed test is not only robust to the presence of structural
breaks, but is also more powerful than the popular IPS test in the basic scenario
where no structural breaks are involved. Furthermore, as reported by Im and Lee
(2001), since the LM test loses little power by controlling for spurious structural
breaks when they do not exist, this represents a reasonable strategy to control for
breaks even when they are only at a suspicious level. Moreover, this panel LM test
does not require the simulation of new critical values that depend on the number and
location of breaks.16
In order to provide a robust analysis, we compare both univariate and panel LM
unit root test results with and without a structural break. We begin with the Schmidt
and Phillips (1992) univariate LM unit root test without any structural change. Then,
we move to extensions that allow for one break, since our time series covers periods
during which structural change may have occurred due to structural and institutional
changes in the EU-15 countries. In addition to the Schmidt and Phillips (1992)
no-break test, we employ the univariate test and the Lee and Strazicich (2003)
minimum LM unit root tests with one break to determine the structural break point
in each country. After determining the optimal break point, we employ the panel
LM unit root test of Im and Lee (2001). For comparison, we also show the panel LM
test results with no breaks.
To determine the optimal break point in the panel LM test, we utilize the
univariate minimum LM unit root tests of Lee and Strazicich (2003). These tests are
Table 6 Results of Moon and Perron (2004) test (1970–2006)
t 9 a t 9 b
First difference of the stock of public debt 0.000 0.000
General government revenue-to-GDP ratios 0.526 0.541
General government expenditure-to-GDP ratios 0.382 0.434
The null hypothesis of the two tests proposed by Moon and Perron (2004) is the unit root for all panel
units. Under the null H0, they show that for (N, T ? ?) with N/T ? 0, the statistics t 9 a and t 9 b
have a standard normal distribution
Note All figures reported in the table are p-values
16 It should be noted that these tests assume cross-sectional independence among panel units.
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comparable to the corresponding Dickey and Fuller-type endogenous break tests of
Zivot and Andrews (1992). The performance of the LM test is comparable to or
superior to these counterpart tests in terms of size and power. In addition, the LM
unit root tests are not subject to spurious rejections under the null. In each test, the
break point is determined endogenously from the data via a grid search by selecting
the break where the value of the unit root test statistic is at its minimum. Using the
minimum LM tests of Lee and Strazicich (2003), the unit root test statistic is
estimated at each break point. The procedure is repeated over the time interval [0.1
T, 0.9 T] in order to eliminate end points, until the break is determined where the
unit root t-test statistic is minimized. The optimal number of lags in each country is
determined by sequentially examining the t-statistic for the last lag coefficient to see
if it is significant at the approximate 5% level in an asymptotic normal distribution.
We begin with the one-break LM test. If less than one break is significant, we
employ the no-break LM unit root test. The corresponding LM unit root test statistic
is then chosen after determining the optimal break point. After determining the
Table 7 Panel LM unit root tests allowing for structural break for the first difference of the stock of
government debt (1970–2006)
Country Individual LM statistic
without a breaka
Lags Individual LM
statistic with a breakb
Lags Optimal
break point
Austria -4.420* 7 -4.707* 7 2003
Belgium -2.246 8 -1.632 1 1995
Denmark -2.288 2 -4.126* 7 2000
Finland -1.945 8 -2.456 3 1993
France -2.997 3 -3.718* 4 1993
Germany -2.877 8 -3.075 8 1993
Greece -3.213* 8 -2.099 8 2002
Ireland -1.444 2 -2.683 5 1995
Italy -4.404* 7 -4.905* 7 2003
Luxembourg -1.449 5 -1.731 4 1997
Netherlands -0.487 3 -0.868 3 1992
Portugal -1.874 3 -2.132 3 2002
Spain -1.599 1 -1.076 1 1993
Sweden -2.129 1 -3.155 1 2000
United Kingdom -2.142 4 -2.169 4 2002
Panel LM stat.c -3.126* -5.077*
Notes As all tests are one-sided, a calculated statistic smaller than the critical value leads to the rejection
of the null of a unit root. At 5% the critical value for the LM test without break is -3.06. At 5% the
critical value for the minimum LM test with one break is -3.566
The critical value for the panel LM test (with or without breaks) is -1.645 with an asymptotic standard
normal distribution
* denotes significance at the 5% level
a Schmidt and Phillips (1992) test; b Lee and Strazicich (2003) test; c Im and Lee (2001) test
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appropriate unit root test statistic for each country, the panel LM test statistic is then
calculated.17
The results are reported in Tables 7, 8 and 9, which respectively show the first
difference of the stock of government debt at 2000 constant prices, and general
government expenditure and revenue taken as a percentage of GDP. For the
univariate LM test with no break, the unit root null can be rejected at the 5% level of
significance in three countries for government debt (Austria, Greece and Italy), in
two countries for government expenditure (Finland and the UK), and in two
countries for government revenue (Denmark and Sweden). After allowing for a
structural break, the univariate minimum LM test rejects the unit root null in four
countries for government debt (Austria, Denmark, France and Italy), in four
countries for government expenditure (Finland, France, Italy and the Netherlands),
and cannot reject it for government revenue at the 5% level.
Table 8 Panel LM unit root tests allowing for structural break for general government revenue-to-GDP
ratios (1970–2006)
Country Individual LM statistic
without a breaka
Lags Individual LM statistic
with a breakb
Lags Optimal
break point
Austria -2.667 2 -2.957 2 1989
Belgium -1.627 3 -2.313 3 1990
Denmark -2.128 6 -2.467 6 1989
Finland -3.901* 8 -3.806* 8 2001
France -3.063 4 -4.205* 6 1995
Germany -1.593 7 -2.492 8 1998
Greece -1.292 0 -1.443 0 1992
Ireland -0.916 5 -0.346 8 1997
Italy -2.284 8 -3.950* 8 1991
Luxembourg 0.502 8 0.362 8 1992
Netherlands -2.070 2 -4.168* 8 1992
Portugal -1.674 0 0.105 8 1988
Spain -1.928 0 -1.577 8 1983
Sweden -0.595 6 -0.811 8 1991
United Kingdom -3.156* 6 -2.141 5 1987
Panel LM stat.c -0.292 -1.62
Notes As all tests are one-sided, a calculated statistic smaller than the critical value leads to the rejection
of the null of a unit root. At 5% the critical value for the LM test without a break is -3.06. At 5% the
critical value for the minimum LM test with one break is -3.566
The critical value for the panel LM test (with or without breaks) is -1.645 with an asymptotic standard
normal distribution
* denotes significance at the 5% level
a Schmidt and Phillips (1992) test; b Lee and Strazicich (2003) test; c Im and Lee (2001) test
17 We are grateful to J. Lee for providing us with the GAUSS codes, which we have adapted for our
analysis, and that are available upon request.
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Without allowing for structural breaks, the panel LM test statistic is -3.126 for
the stock of real government debt series clearly indicating that the unit root null can
be rejected at the 5% level of significance, due to increased power from panel data
(see Table 7). In addition, after allowing for structural breaks, the panel test statistic
of -5.95 strongly rejects the unit root null at the 5% level. These results clearly
demonstrate the gain in power from combining structural breaks with panel data.
Since the panel LM test statistic is calculated using the average test statistic of all
countries, it is possible that the panel results are due to a small number of outliers
having a relatively large impact.
Examination of the univariate test statistics (with breaks) for each country reveals
that Austria, Denmark, France and Italy might qualify as such an outlier, as they are
the only four countries that reject the unit root null at the 5% level. In order to see if
our panel results are robust to a possible outlier effect, we therefore recalculated the
panel LM test statistic (with breaks) omitting these four countries. The resulting
panel test statistic of -3.62 continues to reject the unit root null at the 5% level of
significance, thus firmly supporting our hypothesis that the panel test results are not
due to outliers.
Table 9 Panel LM unit root tests allowing for structural break for general government expenditure-
to-GDP ratios (1970–2006)
Country Individual LM statistic
without a breaka
Lags Individual LM statistic
with a breakb
Lags Optimal
break point
Austria -1.627 3 -1.253 2 1981
Belgium -2.128 6 -1.855 6 1991
Denmark -3.901* 8 -2.055 8 1985
Finland -3.063 4 -1.935 7 1981
France -1.593 7 -1.712 2 1993
Germany -1.292 0 -1.553 6 1993
Greece -0.916 5 -2.779 7 1994
Ireland -2.284 8 -1.487 7 1990
Italy 0.502 8 -2.372 7 2000
Luxembourg -2.070 2 0.234 6 2003
Netherlands -1.674 0 -1.394 7 1985
Portugal -1.928 0 -1.966 8 2000
Spain -0.595 6 -1.898 5 1986
Sweden -3.156* 6 -1.203 1 1993
United Kingdom -1.411 2 -1.326 7 2000
Panel LM stat.c 0.212 0.999
Notes As all tests are one-sided, a calculated statistic smaller than the critical value leads to the rejection
of the null of a unit root. At 5% the critical value for the LM test without a break is -3.06. At 5% the
critical value for the minimum LM test with one break is -3.566
The critical value for the panel LM test (with or without breaks) is -1.645 with an asymptotic standard
normal distribution
* denotes significance at the 5% level
a Schmidt and Phillips (1992) test; b Lee and Strazicich (2003) test; c Im and Lee (2001) test
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Concerning the general government expenditure and the revenue series taken as a
percentage of GDP, it appears that the panel LM test statistics with or without a
break cannot reject the null unit root hypothesis at the 5% level of significance, thus
providing strong evidence in favour of a unit root in these two EU-15 country series.
Overall, our findings using panel data unit root tests that allow for structural
breaks support the previous results of first and second generation panel data unit root
tests, leading us to conclude that the stock of government debt series is integrated of
order zero (indicating that the solvency condition would be satisfied for the EU-15
countries), and that the general government expenditure and the revenue series are
integrated of order one. These findings are summarized in Table 10.
5 Cointegration between government expenditure and revenue ratios
After having confirmed the non-stationarity of our series of government revenue and
expenditure for the EU-15 as a whole, in particular if one refers to the panel data
unit root tests of the previous section, it is natural to test the existence of a structural
Table 10 Summary of stationarity tests, 5% level of significance (H0: unit root, non-stationarity, for
most cases)
Set of
results
First difference of stock of real government debt (2000 constant prices)
1 Panel unit root 1st generation
tests, country independence
Levin et al. (2002), Im et al.
(2003): no unit root
2 Panel unit root 2nd generation
tests, country dependence
Choi (2006): no unit root Moon and Perron (2004):
no unit root
3 Individual LM unit root tests Schmidt and Phillips (1992),
no breaks, no unit root:
AT, GR, IT
Lee and Strazicich (2003),
with breaks, no unit root:
AT, DK, FR, IT
4 Panel LM unit root tests Im and Lee (2001), no breaks:
no unit root
Im and Lee (2001), with
breaks: no unit root
General government
revenue (% of GDP)
General government
expenditure (% of GDP)
5 Panel unit root 1st generation
tests, country independence
Levin et al. (2002), Im et al.
(2003): unit root,
non-stationarity
Levin et al. (2002), Im et al.
(2003): unit root,
non-stationarity
6 Panel unit root 2nd generation
tests, country dependence
Choi (2006) and Moon and
Perron (2004): unit root
Choi (2006) and Moon and
Perron (2004): unit root
7 Individual LM unit root tests Schmidt and Phillips (1992),
no breaks, no unit root: FI,
UK Lee and Strazicich (2003),
with breaks, no unit root: FI,
FR, IT, NL.
Schmidt and Phillips (1992),
no breaks, no unit root:
DK, SW Lee and Strazicich
(2003), with breaks, no unit
root: reject for all countries
8 Panel LM unit root tests Im and Lee (2001), no breaks:
unit root
Im and Lee (2001), with
breaks: unit root
AT Austria, DE Germany, DK Denmark, FI Finland, FR France, GR Greece, IR Ireland, IT Italy, LU
Luxembourg, NL Netherlands, PT Portugal, SW Sweden, UK United Kingdom
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long-run relationship between both series. This is the procedure we use in this
section to assess fiscal sustainability on the basis of the intertemporal budget
constraint as given in (7).
Compared to panel unit root tests, the analysis of cointegration in panels is still at
an early stage of development. So far, the focus of the panel cointegration literature
has been on residual-based approaches, although there have been a number of
attempts to develop system approaches as well. As is the case for panel unit root
tests, panel cointegration tests are based on homogeneous and heterogeneous
alternatives. The residual-based tests were developed to ward against the spurious
regression problem that can arise in panels when dealing with I(1) variables. Such
tests are appropriate when it is a priori known that at most there can be only one
within-group cointegration in the panel. Notable contributions to this strand of the
literature include Pedroni (1999, 2000, 2004), and more recently Westerlund and
Edgerton (2007).
The computation of the Pedroni test statistics assumes cross-sectional indepen-
dence across individual units (apart from common time effects), an assumption that,
as we have already mentioned, is probably absent for many macroeconomic time
series. To take into account the possible cross-sectional dependence when carrying
out the cointegration analysis, we decided to compute the bootstrap distribution of
Pedroni’s test statistics, thereby generating data-specific critical values. As in
Banerjee and Carrion-i-Silvestre (2006), we have of course not used the seven
statistics proposed by Pedroni (1999, 2004) to test the null hypothesis of no
cointegration using single equation methods based on the estimation of static
regressions. These statistics can also be grouped into either parametric or non-
parametric statistics, depending on the way that autocorrelation and endogeneity
bias are accounted for. In our study, we are only concerned with the parametric
version of the statistics, i.e. the normalized bias and the pseudo t-ratio statistics, and
with the ADF test statistics in particular. These test statistics are defined by pooling
the individual tests, so that they belong to the class of between-dimension test
statistics (see Pedroni, 1999, 2004 for further details).
As Banerjee and Carrion-i-Silvestre (2006) stress, some caution is required
concerning the method used to bootstrap cointegration relationships, since not all
available procedures lead to consistent estimates. In this regard, we have followed
Phillips (2001), Park (2002) and Chang et al. (2006) in using a modified version of
the sieve bootstrap described in Banerjee and Carrion-i-Silvestre (2006).18
Table 11 reports the results of the panel data cointegration tests developed by
Pedroni (1999, 2004) both using conventional (asymptotic) critical values (as per
Pedroni, 1999) and bootstrap critical values. We present the results for the entire
sample period, 1970–2006, and for two sub-periods, 1970–1991 and 1992–2006, in
order to assess whether different fiscal realities and behaviour can be detected for
more recent years in the EU, notably after the signing of the Maastricht Treaty with
the setting up of the fiscal convergence criteria.
18 We are grateful to A. Banerjee and J. Carrion-i-Silvestre for providing us with their GAUSS codes (for
a detailed discussion of the method used, see the end of the paper).
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For the period 1970–2006, using conventional asymptotic critical values (-1.65
at 5%) calculated under the assumption of cross-sectional independence (reported in
Pedroni 1999, and extracted from the standard normal distribution), the null
hypothesis of no cointegration between government revenue and expenditure ratios
is always rejected by the test statistics, irrespective of whether the model includes a
constant or a linear trend. However, if we consider bootstrap critical values (which
are valid if there is some dependence among individuals), the conclusions of the test
are less straightforward, and instead crucially depend on the level of significance
chosen. Indeed, at the 10% level of significance, the null hypothesis of no
cointegration is still rejected by the data, but an opposite result is obtained at the 5%
level of significance for a model including either a constant or a linear trend.
Finally, retaining a 10% level of significance, we conclude that a long-run
relationship exists between government revenue and expenditure for the set of
EU-15 countries, whatever the specification of the deterministic component.
We then investigated the robustness of the previous results, implementing panel
data cointegration tests for the two sub-periods 1970–1991 and 1992–2006. The
results are easier to interpret and provide econometric elements that justify this split
on the basis of economic and institutional grounds, as two different types of
behaviour now emerge from the cointegration tests (see Table 11).
First, concerning the 1970–1991 period, if one considers a model with a constant
term, a statistical cointegration relationship clearly exists between government
revenue and expenditure ratios, irrespective of whether one considers the
(asymptotic) p-value or bootstrap critical values at 1, 5 or 10%. The opposite
result is however obtained for a model including a time trend, independently of the
Table 11 Panel cointegration test results between government revenue and expenditure (Pedroni 1999,
2004)
ADF-stat. P-value Bootstrap distribution
1% 5% 10%
Period 1970–2006
Model with no deterministic component -4.38 0.00 -4.88 -4.01 -3.52
Model with a constant term -3.19 0.00 -4.25 -3.31 -2.82
Model including a time trend -4.04 0.00 -5.62 -4.70 -4.03
Period 1970–1991
Model with no deterministic component -5.93 0.00 -7.63 -6.31 -5.63
Model with a constant term -7.38 0.00 -6.68 -5.40 -4.72
Model including a time trend -3.50 0.00 -7.56 -6.69 -5.09
Period 1992–2006
Model with no deterministic component -2.93 0.00 -6.78 -5.53 -4.87
Model with a constant term -1.79 0.03 -7.78 -6.32 -5.62
Model including a time trend -5.79 0.00 -9.22 -7.76 -6.98
Notes The bootstrap is based on 2000 replications
As the tests are one-sided, a calculated statistic smaller than the critical value leads to the rejection of the
null hypothesis of no cointegration
748 A. Afonso, C. Rault
123
critical values used (asymptotic or bootstrap). Finally, intermediate results are
obtained for a model with no deterministic component, for which a long-run
statistical relationship between government revenue and expenditure ratios only
exists with the 10% bootstrap critical value.
Second, the results do not seem to confirm the existence of a cointegration
relationship for the period 1992–2006 between government revenue and expendi-
ture ratios in the EU-15 panel data set. This result is valid for any specification of
the deterministic component considered, and is robust to the critical value used
(asymptotic or bootstrap) for the conventional levels of significance. In this context,
we should recall that after the beginning of the new millennium, the EU faced an
economic recession (mirroring the beginning of the 1990s), with several countries
entering into an excessive deficit procedure (EDP) situation within the fiscal
framework of the SGP. The reason why some countries faced an EDP depended, to
some extent, on the difficulties encountered in implementing sound fiscal policies in
‘‘good times’’ and thus the lack of budgetary manoeuvre in the recession period.
Such developments may explain the different results regarding fiscal sustainability
obtained in our analysis for this more recent period.
In order to assess the robustness of our findings, we also implemented the
bootstrap panel cointegration test proposed by Westerlund and Edgerton (2007).
Unlike the panel data cointegration tests of Pedroni (1999, 2004), here the null
hypothesis is now cointegration. This new test relies on the popular Lagrange
multiplier test of McCoskey and Kao (1998), and permits correlation to be
accommodated both within and between the individual cross-sectional units. In
addition, the bootstrap suggested by Westerlund and Edgerton (2007) is based on
the sieve-sampling scheme, and has the appealing advantage of significantly
reducing the distortions of the asymptotic test.19 The results reported in Table 12 for
a model including either a constant term or a linear trend clearly indicate the
absence of a cointegrating relationship between government revenue and
Table 12 Panel cointegration test results between government revenue and expenditure (Westerlund and
Edgerton 2007, the null hypothesis of the tests is cointegration between government revenue and
expenditure)
LM-stat. Asymptotic p-value Bootstrap p-value
Period 1970–2006
Model with a constant term 7.08 0.00 0.02
Model including a time trend 3.90 0.00 0.02
Period 1970–1991
Model with a constant term 0.63 0.26 0.44
Model including a time trend 2.10 0.01 0.02
Period 1992–2006
Model with a constant term 1.37 0.08 0.16
Model including a time trend 3.22 0.00 0.19
Note the bootstrap is based on 2,000 replications
19 We are grateful to J. Westerlund for making available his GAUSS codes to us.
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expenditure since with an asymptotic p-value of 0.00, the null hypothesis of
cointegration is always rejected. This result is only marginally modified if one refers
to the bootstrap critical value, indicating that for a significant level higher than 2%,
the null hypothesis is still rejected. Hence at the conventional 5 and 10% levels of
significance, we can conclude that there is no cointegrating relationship between
government revenue and expenditure for the EU-15 panel data set.
Interestingly, performing the panel data cointegration tests for the two sub-
periods 1970–1991 and 1992–2006 produces strong evidence in favour of the
existence of a cointegration relationship between government revenue and
expenditure ratios for the model with a constant term, with bootstrap p-values of
44% for the period 1970–1991, and 16% for the period 1992–2006. Hence, the
necessary condition for public finance sustainability, i.e. the existence of a
cointegration relationship between government revenue and expenditure, seems to
be verified for the two sub-periods using this bootstrap panel cointegration test.
We further investigated whether public finances were sustainable for the model
including a constant term, following the panel fully modified OLS approach
developed in Pedroni (1996, 2000) and using a t-statistic to test whether the panel
cointegration coefficient of the general government expenditure-to-GDP ratios is
equal to one or not in the cointegrating regression where the government revenue-
to-ratio is the dependent variable. For the period 1970–2006, the calculated
t-statistic of 5.03 is above the tabulated critical values extracted from the normal
distribution (1.96 and 2.33, respectively at the 5 and 1% levels of significance). The
confidence intervals for this coefficient, at the 5% level of significance, [1.023;
1.136], confirm that the value of the coefficient is likely to be higher than one. For
the two sub-periods, the 5% confident intervals for the coefficient are respectively
[0.868; 1.072] for the period 1970–1991, and [0.678; 0.841] for the period 1992–
2006. This therefore indicates that the coefficient in the cointegration relation is
likely to be equal to one for the period 1970–1991, which provides evidence of the
sustainability of public finances in that period.
Finally, we also tested, along the lines of MacDonald (1992), the possibility of
cointegration between the primary balance ratio and the government debt-to-GDP
ratio, which represents a possible avenue for assessing the sustainability of public
finances, provided that both series are I(1) processes. However, the panel unit root
tests for those series, as reported in sect. 8, show that while the government debt-to-
GDP ratio is indeed I(1), the primary balance ratio is I(0), which thus excludes the
possibility of the existence of a cointegration relationship between these two
series.20
6 Conclusion
This paper has drawn on recent advances in the econometrics of non-stationary
panel data methods to assess the sustainability of public finances for the EU-15
20 Similar results, not reported here, are obtained with the implementation of the panel data tests of the
second generation by Moon and Perron (2004) and Choi (2006).
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countries in the period 1970–2006. Starting from the present value borrowing
constraint of governments, we investigate past fiscal data to see if the stock of real
government debt follows a stationary process, or if there is cointegration between
government revenue and government expenditure as a percentage of GDP.
The econometric methods used in the paper to assess the sustainability of public
finances in the EU-15 rest upon (1) first generation panel data integration tests that
assume cross-sectional independence among panel units (apart from common time
effects); (2) two-second generation panel data unit root tests that relax the
assumption of cross-sectional independence; (3) panel data unit root tests that
enable to accommodate structural breaks, and (4) the panel data cointegration tests
developed by Pedroni (1999, 2004) and generalized by Banerjee and Carrion-i-
Silvestre (2006), and the bootstrap panel cointegration test by Westerlund and
Edgerton (2007).
The results from these panel unit root tests, allowing for structural breaks,
support the results of both the first and second generation panel data unit root tests,
leading us to conclude that the first difference of the stock of real government debt
series is integrated of order zero, thus indicating that the solvency condition would
be satisfied for EU-15 countries, which is a necessary condition for fiscal policy
sustainability. Moreover, our results also show that general government expenditure
and revenue ratios are integrated of order one.
Even if the results of the analysis may question fiscal sustainability in some cases
when taken individually, it is nevertheless true that the tests point to the solvency of
government public finances when considering the EU-15 panel data set. Naturally,
this is an obvious advantage of the panel approach, since the time series dimension
of the data is not that long for individual countries. Even if there is no single fiscal
policy in the EU, the panel sustainability of public finances indicated by our results
is relevant in a context of EU countries seeking to pursue sound fiscal policy
behaviour within the SGP framework. Nevertheless, what we can also conclude
from our analysis is that for some particular cases sustainability will not be attained
if past fiscal behaviour is to be kept unchanged in the future. For instance, and as we
saw, the solvency condition, on the basis of the stationarity tests of government
debt, was satisfied for roughly half of the 15 EU countries: Austria, Finland, France,
Germany, the Netherlands, the UK and Sweden. This set of countries is even smaller
once we take into account the existence of structural breaks in the series.
Interestingly, the panel cointegration results for the entire 1970–2006 period
allow us to draw the conclusion that a long-run relationship does exist between
general government revenue and expenditure ratios for the set of EU-15 countries,
at least at the 10% level of significance, both using conventional (asymptotic)
critical values given in Pedroni (1999), and bootstrap panel cointegration proposed
by Westerlund and Edgerton (2007). Moreover, this conclusion holds for the two
sub-periods, 1970–1991 and 1992–2006 (broadly before and after the Maastricht
Treaty), for most of the cointegration tests carried out.
Naturally, one has to stress that in this paper we assessed fiscal sustainability
taking into account the stock of explicit government debt, and also via the analysis
of cointegration relationships between the flows of government expenditures and
revenues. Other aspects, outside the scope of analysis of the paper, and which are
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also relevant for the sustainability of public finances, are on the one hand the
existence of implicit government liabilities, and on the other hand population ageing
in combination with insufficiently funded public pension schemes that may
endanger fiscal sustainability in the future.
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Appendix A
See Table 13.
Appendix B: panel unit root tests, additional results
See Tables 14 and 15.
Table 13 Summary of standard individual unit root test results
Set of
results
First difference of stock of real government debt (2000 constant prices)
1 Individual unit root tests ADF, no unit root: AT, FI, FR,
UK, SW
PP, no unit root: AT, IR,
LU, SW
2 Individual unit root tests,
with breaks
ZA, no unit root: FI, UK
General government
revenue (% of GDP)
General government
expenditure (% of GDP)
3 Individual unit root tests ADF, no unit root: AT, DE,
LU, SW
PP, no unit root: AT, FI,
DE, LU, SW, UK
ADF, no unit root: DE, UK
PP, no unit root: DE, LU, PT, UK
4 Individual unit root tests,
with breaks
ZA, no unit root: no countries ZA, no unit root: FI, FR, LU,
PT, SP
(a) AT Austria, DE Germany, DK Denmark, FI Finland, FR France, GR Greece, IR Ireland, IT Italy, LU
Luxembourg, NL Netherlands, PT Portugal, SP Spain, SW Sweden, UK United Kingdom
(b) ADF refers to the Augmented Dickey–Fuller unit-root test; PP to the Phillips–Perron (PP) unit-root
test (1988); ZA to the endogenous unit root tests by Zivot and Andrews (1992), allowing for one
structural breaks
(c) For further details and explanation on the results of the conventional unit root tests we refer the reader
to the extended working paper version in Afonso and Rault (2007)
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